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THE FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT: TOWARD 
A PUNITIVE PHILOSOPHY 
NoRVAL MoRRis* 
P ROPER use of imprisonment as a penal sanction is of primary philosophical and practical importance to the future of society. 
With the increasing vulnerability of our social organization and the 
growing complexity and interdependence of governmental structures, 
reassessment of appropriate limits on the power that society should 
exercise over its members becomes increasingly important. Perhaps 
if the "prison problem" is solved, many of the uneasy tensions be-
nveen freedom and power in postindustrial society will diminish. · 
The effort made here will, I hope, contribute to the solution of the 
"prison problem" by offering a new model of imprisonment that 
recognizes fundamental principles of justice as well as the legitimate 
exercise of society's power over the individual. 
We need to address nvo blunt questions in constructing a new 
model of imprisonment: (1) Why imprison a convicted criminal in 
the first instance? (2) Why not imprison all convicted criminals 
until risk of future criminality is past? Any useful response to these 
questions requires me to outline a philosophy under which imprison-
ment can be applied with restraint and humanity until it is no longer 
needed for social control. 
My premise throughout is that penal purposes are properly re-
tributive, deterrent, and incapacitative. Attempts to add reformative 
purposes to that mixture-as an objective of the sanction as dis-
tinguished from a collateral aspiration-yield neither clemency, 
justice, nor, as presently administered, social utility. We may utilize 
our rehabilitative skills to assist the prisoner toward social readjust-
ment, but we should never seek to justify an extension of power over 
him on the ground that we may thus more likely effect his reform.1 
• Julius Kreeger Professor of Law and Criminology and Director of the Center for 
Studies in Criminal Justice, University of Chicago Law School. LL.B. 1946, LL.M. 1947, 
University of Melbourne; Ph.D. 1949, London University.-Ed. 
Copyright © 1974 by Norval Morris. 
This article is a revised version of the third of three lectures given by the author 
in the Thomas M. Cooley Lecture Series, University of Michigan Law School, on March 
19, 20, and 21, 1974. 
I. The proper use of rehabilitation in the prison context was fully explored by 
Professor Morris in the first Cooley lecture. The reader interested in a more complete 
exposition of Professor Morris's views may consult N. MORRIS, THE FUTURE OF IM-
PRISONMENT, to be published shortly by the University of Chicago Press. For another 
recent view, see L. OHLIN, CoRRECTIONAL STRATEGIES IN CONFLicr, paper presented to 
the American Philosophical Society, Nov. 9, 1973 (to be published in the Proceedings 
of the Society).-Ed. 
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l. WHY SHOULD A CONVICTED CRIMINAL BE IMPRISONED? 
I 
As usual, clarification of what is not involved in this question is 
a necessary prelude to answering what is. I am not discussing the 
challenging and significant problems involved in setting terms of 
imprisonment in a way that guarantees that like cases will be treated 
alike and all treated fairly. The principles suggested will, with 
suitable modifications, apply to the assessment of the appropriate 
duration of imprisonment by the legislature and by the judge, and 
to all sentencing decisions as they are later taken by parole boards 
and correctional authorities. However, for ease of analysis the present 
effort isolates the issue of imprisonment vel non. The objective is 
to offer principles to aid a judge in determining whether he should 
impose a sentence of imprisonment or some lesser sanction. Although 
these principles apply whenever this issue is addressed-by the legis-
lator, the prosecutor, the judge, the parole board member-analysis 
is focused on .the judge's decision. 
Clarity is best served by sketching the complete model in relatively 
narrow compass before elaborating on its details. First, three prin-
ciples to guide the decision to imprison are submitted: 
(I) Parsimony: The least restrictive or least punitive sanc-
tion necessary to achieve defined social purposes should be 
chosen. 
(2) Dangerousness: Prediction of future criminality is an un-
just basis for determining that the convicted criminal should be 
imprisoned. 
(3) Desert: No sanction greater than that "deserved" by the 
last crime or bout of crimes for which the offender is being 
sentenced should be imposed. 
Thereafter, three conjunctive preconditions to the judicial imposi-
tion of a sentence of imprisonment are developed in more concrete 
form: 
(1) Conviction by jury or bench trial or a procedurally ac-
ceptable guilty plea to an offense for which the legislature has 
prescribed imprisonment; 
(2) Determination that imprisonment is the least restrictive 
sanction appropriate in the particular case because either a) a 
lesser punishment would depreciate the seriousness of the 
crime(s) committed; b) imprisonment of some who have done 
what the particular criminal has done is necessary to achieve 
socially justified deterrent purposes, and his punishment ad-
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vances that end; or c) other less restrictive sanctions have been 
frequently or recently applied to him; and 
(3) Judgment that imprisonment is not a punishment that 
society would deem undeserved or excessive in relation to the 
last crime or series of crimes that the individual has committed. 
It may assist to offer some commentary on the principles suggested 
to guide the decision to imprison and then to draw a sharp con-
trast between the preconditions to imprisonment submitted here and 
those adopted in most of the recent criminal codes. 
A. Parsimony 
/ 
The first principle recommends parsimony in the use of imprison-
ment. This principle is not novel. A presumption in favor of punish-
ments less severe than incarceration pervades all recent scholarship 
and most legislative reforms. Justification for this utilitarian and 
humanitarian principle follows from the belief that any punitive 
suffering beyond societal need is, presumably, what defines cruelty. 
Emerging case law and commentary supports this principle of the least 
drastic means.2 Specifically, the draftsmen of the American Law In-
stitute's (ALI) Model Penal Code sought to include the principle in 
the Code's main article on sentencing. Section 7.01, enumerating 
"Criteria for Withholding Sentence of Imprisonment and for Placing 
Defendant on Probation," directs the court to order other punish-
ments unless "imprisonment is necessary for protection of the pub-
lic."8 Over one-half of the states have undertaken substantial revision 
of their criminal codes during the past decade, all profoundly influ-
enced by the ALI model. The same influence is apparent in current 
proposals for reform of the federal criminal code. In accord are the 
American Bar Association's Project on Minimum Standards for 
Criminal Justice4 and the recommendations of the two national 
crime commissions of the past decade.5 Moreover, although constitu-
2. See, e.g., Singer, Sending Men to Prison: Constitutional° Aspects of the Burden 
of Proof and the Doctrine of the Least Drastic Alternative as Applied to Sentencing 
Determinations, 58 CORNELL L REv. 51 (1972). Cf. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 
(1972); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1968); Goodwin v. Oswald, 462 F.2d 1237 
(2d Cir. 1972); Wormuth &: Mirkin, The Doctrine of the Reasonable Alternative, 9 
UTAH L. REv. 254 (1964); Note, Less Drastic Means and the First Amendment, 78 
YALE L.J. 464 (1969). 
3. MODEL PENAL CODE (Prop. Official Draft, 1962) [hereinafter ALI CODE]. Of special 
interest are sections 7.0l(l)(a), 7.01(2)(i), and 7.03(3). Cf. id., Article 6. 
4. ABA PROJECT ON :MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JumCE, SENTENCING ALTER-
NATIVES AND PROCEDURES §§ 2.2, 2.3 (1968) [hereinafter ABA PROJEcr]. 
5. PRESIDENT'S COMMN. ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JumCE, THE 
CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIErY 141-43 (1967); NATIONAL ADVISORY CoMMN. ON 
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tional support for the parsimony principle is hesitant, the analogies 
are clear. Imprisonment as a sanction for a common cold or for 
being a narcotic addiot would be unconstitutional;6 to place a pris-
oner involved in a scuffie into maximum security segregation for two 
years may be invalid as punishment not reasonably related to the in-
fraction for which it was imposed;7 and the death penalty would be 
unconstitutional for a rape in which life was neither taken nor endan-
gered.8 Finally, courts and legislatures have expressly accepted the 
principle of parsixp.ony in relation both to the civil commitment 
of the mentally ill and the conditions of their detention. 0 Goldstein, 
Freud, and Solnit, in their important new study Beyond the Best 
Interests of the Child, offer a principle similar to that of the least 
restrictive or least punitive sanction, applicable to all situations in 
which child placement by a court is involved, expressly including 
juvenile delinquency matters involving violence. Even were the law 
to make society's immediate safety the primary goal, they would 
argue that the least detrimental alternative placement should be 
selected.10 
The wisdom of parsimonious use of imprisonment is no longer 
questioned, unless doubt is cast upon it by the second fundamental 
question we face-why not imprison all criminals convicted of seri-
ous crime until risk of their recidivism is past? I will return to that 
question shortly. 
B. Dangerousness 
With the second principle-that dangerousness as a predictor of 
future criminality is an unjust basis for imprisoning-we move from 
the broadly accepted to the highly contentious. 
Let me try to define the issue precisely before grappling with it. 
Courts around the world impose imprisonment instead of commu-
nity-based punishments, or increase terms of imprisonment beyond 
the measure that the specific crime justifies, for a variety of grounds 
that resemble what I will call "dangerousness." The grounds include: 
CRIMINAL JumCE STANDARDS AND GOALS, TASK FORCE ON Coruu:cnoNs 150-54 (1973) 
[hereinafter TASK FORCE ON CoRlU!.CTIONS]. 
6. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962). 
7. Fulwood v. Clemmer, 206 F. Supp. 370 (D.D.C. 1962). 
8. Ralph v. Warden, 438 F.2d 786 (4th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 952 (1972). 
9. See Covington v. Harris, 419 F.2d 617 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Lake v. Cameron, lJ6,i 
F:2d 657 (D.C. Cir. 1969); D.C. CoDE ANN. § 21-545(b) (1966); Developments in the Law 
-Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 87 HARV. L. REV, 1190, 1245-53 (1974). 
10. A.- GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST lNTEREstS OF THE CIIILD 
153 (1973). 
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The criminal committed crime before; he committed this type of 
crime before; he committed many crimes before; he has made a pro-
fession of crime; he committed niany other crimes at about the same 
time as this one; he acted with peculiar brutality, or used a gun, or 
determinedly retained the proceeds of his crime; or there has been 
a recent rash of similar crimes. All these grounds merit consideration. 
I set them aside in favor of closer analysis of one other ground that 
seems t6 be gaining acceptance in the United States and in Europe, 
namely, that the crime and what we learn of the criminal lead us to 
the view that he probably will commit a serious crime of personal 
violence in the future. This prediction is what I will term the pre-
diction of dangerousness. 
There is a seductive appeal to separating the dangerous and the 
nondangerous offender and confining imprisonment principally to 
the former. It would be such a neat trick were it possible: prophy-
lactic punishment-the preemptive judicial strike, scientifically jus-
tified-designed to save potential victims of future crimes and at the 
same time minimize the use of imprisonment and reduce the time 
served by most prisoners. But it is a trap. Social consequences are 
often counterintuitive. The concept of dangerousness is so plastic 
and vague, its implementation so imprecise, that it would not sub-
stantially reduce the present excessive use of imprisonment. 
It must be admitted, however, that dangerousness as a determina-
tive guide to the use of imprisonment does have impressive support. 
Perhaps most impressive are the reform efforts of Herbert Wechsler, 
Paul Tappan, Francis Allen, and a small group of other scholars and 
practitioners in the mid-1950's and early 1960's. Those efforts, doubt-
less the most important attempt to bring-rationality to the criminal 
law since the codification efforts of Macauley and Stephen in the,last 
quarter of the nineteenth century, are embodied in the sentencing 
provisions of the ALI Model Penal Code.11 The themes behind the 
provisions are, in the main, sound and .worthy of emulation. First, 
fines and community-based treatments such as probation, where rea-
sonably applicable, are preferable to imprisonment as penal sanc-
tions. Second, the range of prison sentences for felonies should be 
reduced to three or four categories of gravity. Third, within those 
categories, the grounds on which a court may exercise its discretion 
to impose imprisonment should be defined with some degree of 
precision. A principal aim t~roughout, if judges can be persuaded 
or required to give reasons for their sentences, is to b:Uild a common 
11. ALI ConE, supra note 3, §§ 701-09. 
1166 Michigan Law Review [Vol, 72:1161 
law of sentencing. Provisions for appeal against sentence have simi• 
lar purposes. Finally, however, the Model Penal Code and its 
progeny provide for the imposition of "extended terms" of imprison-
ment upon persistent, professional, psychologically disturbed, and 
dangerous or multiple offenders.12 
The final provision, specifically as it makes dangerousness a 
determinative guide to the use of imprisonment, has been widely 
adopted. The National Council on Crime and Delinquency (NCCD), 
for instance, maintains that "confinement is necessary only for of-
fenders who, if not confined, would be a serious danger to the 
public.''13 The 1973 Task Force on Corrections of the National Ad-
visory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals recom-
mends that "state penal code revisions should include a provision 
that a maximum sentence for any offender not specifically found to 
represent a substantial danger to others should not exceed 5 years 
for felonies other than murder."14 Extended terms beyond five years, 
indeed up to twenty-five years, might be imposed on the "persistent 
felony offender," the "professional criminal," and the "dangerous 
offender.''15 The Code has also profoundly influenced the reshaping 
of the criminal codes of a number of states16 and other states are in 
the process of emulation. If Congress acts on.a new federal criminal 
code, I have no doubt that it ·will also incorporate sentencing provi-
·sions fashioned after the ALI Model Penal Code prototype.17 
The various proposals share a desire to reduce the use of impris-
onment as a penal sanction by favoring less drastic punishments, by 
shortening prison sentences imposed on those criminals who have to 
be imprisoned, and by selecting defined categories of criminals for 
12. Id. § 7.03. See also .ADVISORY CoUNCIL OF JUDGES OF THE NATL. COUNCIL ON CRIME 
AND DELINQUENCY, MODEL SENTENCING Acr, art. III, § 5 (1972): ABA PROJEcr, supra 
note 4, §§ 2.5, 3.1. An excellent guide to the literature in this area and the area of 
sentencing and correctional issues generally is R. GoLDFARB &: L. SINGER, AFI'ER CON• 
VICl'ION (1973). 
13. The Nondangerous Offender Should Not Be Imprisoned, A Policy Statement, 
19 CRIME &: DELINQUENCY 449, 449 (1973). 
Sometimes the same theme is developed in different and more apparently acceptable 
language. The American Assembly's Report on "Prisoners in America" recommended 
that "[h]igh risk offenders may be required to serve fixed periods of time. Low risk 
offenders should be released to community-based programs as soon as feasible." RE-
FORT OF THE 42n AMERICAN AssEMBLY 7 (December l7-20, 1972). For the background 
reading to this report see PRISONERS IN AMERICA (L. Ohlin ed. 1973). 
14. TASK FORCE ON CoRRECl'IONS, supra note 5, at 150. 
15. Id. at 155-57. 
16. E.g., ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-6-1 (1973); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 65.00 
(McKinney Supp. 1973). 
17. See NAnONAL COMMN. ON REroRM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAws, STUDY DRAFT OF 
A NEW FEDERAL CRIMINAL CODE § 3202(5) (1970) [hereinafter STUDY DRAFT]. 
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· protracted incarceration, largely on grounds of their dangerousness. · 
Admittedly benevolent purposes inspire these legislative and schol-
arly reform efforts. Only the dangerous are to be imprisoned; only 
the very dangerous are to be protractedly imprisoned. However, we 
are far enough down the road of penal reform to realize that benevo-
lent purposes do not guarantee 'f:eneficent results. 
One can well understand the politics of the taxonomy without 
accepting the concepts on which it is based. An effort to confine im-
prisonment to the dangerous has obvious political appeal. Provision 
for extended sentences for the particularly dangerous may allew us 
to avoid the worst abuses of the habitual criminal and the sexual 
psychopath laws whose application has proved grotesquely unjust 
throughout this country.18 Indeed, the political justifications for the 
use of the danger~usness concept are sometimes expressly recognized. 
For example, the report of the National Advisory Commission sug-
gests that "[c]lear authority to sentenc~ the 'dangerous offender' to 
a long term of incapacitation may induce the legislature to agree 
more readily to a significantly shorter sentence for the nondangerous 
offender.''19 In other words, let us continue to deal unjustly with a 
few so that we can persuade the legislature to deal more effectively 
and fairly with the many! 
Predictions of future criminality, it is submitted, are an un-
just basis for imposing or prolonging imprisonment. Despite the 
weight of authority supporting the principle of dangerousness, it 
must be rejected because it presupposes a capacity to predict quite 
beyond our present or foreseeable technical ability. We are not in-
quiring whether the ill-educated, feckless, vocationally deprived 
ghetto youth is likely to be involved in crime-of course he is. We 
are not talking about minor crime or crime in general. The focus is 
on our capacity to predict crimes of some gravity, mostly crimes of 
violence to the person. 
Although predictions of violent crime can fail in two ways, we 
18. See generally Cohen, Adminll:tration of the Criminal Sexual Psychopath Statute 
in Indiana, 32 IND. LJ. 450 (1957); Granucci 8: Granucci, Indiana's Sexual Psychopath 
Act in Operation, 44 IND. L.J. 555 (1969); Hacker 8: Frym, The Sexual Psychopath 
Act in Practice: A Critical Discussion, 43 CALIF. L. R.Ev. '766 (1955); Swanson, Sexual 
Psychopath Statutes: Summary and Analysis, 51 J. CRIM. L.C. 8: P.S. 215 (1960); Tappan, 
Some Myths About the Sex Offender, 19 FED. PROB., June, 1955 at 7; Note, Out of Tune 
with the Times; The Massachusetts SDP Statute, 45 B.U. L. R.Ev. 391 (1965); 
Note, The Plight of the Sexual Psychopath: A Legislative Blunder and Judicial Acqui-
escence, 41 NOTRE DAME LAw. 527 (1966); Note, The Illinois Sexually Dangerous Persorn 
Act, 1966 U. !LL. LF. 449; Comment, California's Sexual Psychopath-Criminal or Pa-
tient?, 1 u. SAN FRAN. L. REv. ?32 (1967). 
19. TASK FORCE ON CORRECTIONS, nipra note 5, at 156. 
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have developed an extremely useful technique to conceal the most 
troublesome failures from ourselves. Illustratively, suppose that we 
attempt to project future violence to the person from among one 
hundred convicted criminals. Permit me to invent figures that are 
far superior to any we can now achieve. Assume that of the one hun-
dred, we select thirty as likely future violent criminals. Despite our 
prediction, all one hundred are either released or left at large. Ob-
serving their subsequent careers, we obtain the results with hypoth-
etical precision. Of the thirty predicted as dangerous, twenty do 
commit serious crimes of violence and ten do not. Of the seventy 
we declare to be relatively safe, five commit crimes of violence 
and sixty-five do not. Table I summarizes the data: 
Prediction 
Safe 
Violent Crime 
70 
so 
100 
TABLE I 
Result 
No Violent Crime 
65 
IO 
75 
Violent Crime 
5 
20 
25 
Reading this chart one might claim "We had eighty per cent 
success in our prediction, successfully preselecting twenty out of the 
twenty-five who later committed serious crimes of violence." We 
failed to select five of the one hundred who later proved to be dan-
gerous, hut that seems a minor failure compared with the twenty 
serious crimes we could have prevented. Note, however, that we also 
failed in another way. We selected ten as dangerous-as likely to 
commit crimes of violence-but they were not. Had we exercised 
greater power over the thirty that we predicted as dangerous we 
would have failed in our prediction by needlessly detaining ten per-
sons. More succinctly, we made twenty "true positive" predictions of 
violence and ten "false positive" predictions. 
To increase our claimed eighty per cent success-to diminish 
the number we predicted as safe but who were in fact dangerous-
we could certainly increase the number of our true positive predic-
tions of dangerousness, but only at the cost of substantially increasing 
the number of false positive predictions. There, if you :will reflect 
on it, is the moral dilemma we face: How many false positives can 
we justify in exchange for preventing crimes perpetrated by the true 
positives? I shall return to this dilemma below. 
Rarely in practice do we have an opportunity to confront the 
naked jurisprudential issues in the neat hypothetical form posed 
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here. Moreover, we possess·an extremely convenient mechanism by 
which to conceal from ourselves our critical incapacity as predictors 
-the mask of overprediction. If in doubt, put him in or keep him 
in. Why risk injury or death to potential innocent victiJD.S, particu-
larly since the freedom involved is that of a person who has been 
convicted of crime? I do not mean to sound pejorative; I would no 
doubt feel pressured to do the same thing myself. If unsure about 
the future violent behavior of a person currently under control and 
for whom that control can legally be prolonged, the politically safe 
choice is to give the benefit of the, doubt to any future victim 
rather than to the criminal or to the prisoner. What is wonderfully 
convenient about this overprediction of risk is that the predictor 
does not know who in particular he needlessly holds. Further, 
he is most unlikely to precipitate any political or administrative 
trouble in ordering or prolonging imprisonment. By contrast, one 
is quite likely to be in water too warm for comfort when those people 
whom one has released, but who could legally have been detained, 
do involve themselves in crimes of violence, particularly if those 
crimes are sensationally reported. Hence, the path of administrative 
and political safety is the path of the overpredicted risk. 
A further important consequence of the mask of overprediction 
is that we lack sufficient empirical studies of our predictive capacity. 
All of us, of course, are masters at retrospective prediction, charac-
terized by the tired phrase, "I told you so." We are less sure of our 
capacity as prospective predictors, in part because we are not in the 
position critically to test our predictions while those we have pre-
dicted as dangerous languish in institutions. Two recent opportuni-
ties to test the matter demonstrate the point. One occurred by force 
of a judicial decision, the other by the diligence of an imaginative 
and protracted research effort. 
The United States ~upreme Court's decision in Baxstrom v. 
Herold20 presented a natural experiment in the overprediction of 
dangerousness. The state of New York had been classifying psycho-
logically disturbed prisoners as suitable for detention in the institu-
tion for the criminally insane at Dannemora.21 Some were held in 
this institution beyond the term of their sentence, if, after psychiatric 
examination, they were deemed mentally ill and dangerous to them-
selves or to others. The Court affirmed the rather obvious proposi-
tion that such prisoners could. not be held beyond the period of their 
20. 383 lf.s. 101 (1966). 
21. See also Carroll v. McNeil, 294 F.2d 117 {2d Cir. 1961), · vacated, 369 U.S. 149 
{1962). 
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original criminal sentence without receiving the usual due process 
protections of the ordinary civil commitment procedures. When the 
prisoner's criminal sentence expires he must be given the same pro-
tections given ordinary persons, not merely the lesser protections the 
state extends to mentally ill prisoners. The immediate administra-
tive effect of this decision was to compel the release or transfer to 
ordinary mental hospitals of each of the 967 "Baxstrom patients." 
They had to be either released into the community or committed 
to civil mental hospitals pursuant to ordinary civil commitment 
procedures. 
Several studies of the subsequent careers of these predicted dan-
gerous criminals have sought to determine the results of the mass re-
lease occasioned by the Supreme Court's decision. The broad con-
clusion is that there W'as gross overprediction of dangerousness. 
Perhaps the most intensive study was that reported in 1971 by Doctor 
Henry Steadman and his associates. They conclude, in part: 
Two striking facts about the Baxstrom patients are the high propor-
tion released after transfer to the civil hospitals and the low propor-
tion subsequently readmitted .... 
. . . [D]uring their first year of civil hospitalization the Baxstrom 
patients were not as troublesome as had been expected. Our findings 
suggest that they were equally not dangerous after they were re-
leased. Between 1966 and 1970, barely 21 of the 967 Baxstrom pa-
tients returned to Matteawan or Dannemora. All of the findings 
- seriously question the legal and psychiatric structures that retained 
these 967 people for an average of 13 [years] in institutions for the 
criminally insane.22 
The Baxstrom patients certainly proved less dangerous than pre-
dicted. The Steadman study worked with 246 of the 967 released. 
Only three per cent of that group were returned to correctional facili-
ties or institutions for the criminally insane between 1966 and Octo-
ber 1970. Their release rate from civil hospitals was higher than that 
of comparable patients civilly committed to state hospitals. With 
respect to their community adjustment, a large number-fifty-six per 
cent of the males and forty-three per cent of the females-had no sub-
sequent readmission to mental hospitals during th~ four years cov-
22. Steadman &: Halfon, The Baxstrom Patients: Backgrounds and Outcomes, 3 
SEMINARS IN PSYCHIATRY 376, 384 (1971). The findings are updated in Steadman &: 
Keveles, The Community Adjustment and Criminal Activity of the Ba:<strom Patients: 
1966-70, 129 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 304 (1972). A book-length analysis of th~ careers of the 
Baxstrom patients, related to other studies of the criminally insane, is currently being 
considered for publication under the title of H. STEADMAN &: J. CocoZZA, CAREERS OF 
THE CRIMINALLY INSANE. 
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ered by the study. Subsequent-criminal activity was also low:Thir-
teen of the eighty-four released patients for whom there was adequate 
follow-up information had a total of eighteen criminal contacts with 
the police, a remarkably Im~ rate considering the fact that all had 
been held as dangerous criminals, likely to be violent. · 
In effect, the Supreme Court in Baxstrom compelled the testing 
of our predictions of violence; the test revealed massive overpredic-
tion. To regard practice in New York and the institutions of Dan-
nemora and Matteawan as lying outside the mainstream of practice in 
institutions for the criminally insane would be erroneous. The story 
of the Baxstrom patients could be told for many of the people we 
currently hold in prisons and mental hospitals in many parts of the 
world because we deem them likely to be involved in future violence. 
A recent research project lends further support to this ~onclu-
sion. In October 1972, Doctors Harry Kozol, Richard Boucher, and 
Ralph Garofalo reported on a ten-year study designed to test their 
capacity to define and predict dangerousness.23 They selected a, high 
risk group of offenders in Massachusetts prisons. With unusually ex-
tensive clinical and social case work resources-independent exam-
inations in every case by at least two psychiatrists and a social worker 
-they endeavored to predict the likely future dangerousness of each 
offender prior to his consideration for release. They identified for 
the releasing authority those offenders who in their view were dan-
gerous and those who were not. Their thesis was that "[t]he validity 
of our diagnostic criteria and the effectiveness of treatment may be 
judged by comparing the behavior of patients released on our recom-
mendation with the behavior of those who were released against our 
advice."24 Table II summarizes the results of the Kozol study:25 
Prediction 
Safe 
Violent Crime 
386 
49 
435 
TABLE II 
Result 
No Violent Crime 
355 
32 
387 
Violent Crime 
31 (lM) 
17 (2M) 
48 
The Kozol team was attempting to predict serious assaultive be-
havior. They were remarkably effective predictors, functioning at 
23. Kozol, Boucher &: Garofalo, The Diagnosis and Treatment of Dangerousness,. 
18 CRIME &: DELINQUENCY 371 (1972). 
24. Id. at 389. 
25, The figures "IM" and "2M" in the violent crime rolumn refer to one murder 
and two murders, respectively. 
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the forefront of our present clinical predictive capacity.20 Though 
the likelihood of assaultive behavior was more than four times 
greater among those released against the researchers' advice than for 
those released on their advice,27 consider the cost paid. 0£ the forty-
nine who were released against the advice of the Kozol team, thirty-
two did not subsequently commit any serious assaultive crimes dur-
ing five years of freedom. S,wing each true positive-benefiting the 
community and, indeed, the offender by preventing his inevitable 
commission of a serious assaultive crime-requires the detention of 
t\vo others who were also expected to be involved in serious assaultive 
behavior, but who, in fact, would not be so involved were they re-
leased. Detention of t\vo false positives is the cost of preventing one 
true positive. Kozol and his associates are, of course, fully aware of 
this tradeoff, and their report is a model of the careful collection of 
data that policy makers must have to face the difficult jurisprudential 
and ethical problems that underlie the proper use of imprisonment.28 
We must not leave this area without appreciating the political 
danger in the current widespread acceptance of dangerousness as a 
justification for imposing imprisonment or as a basis for prolonging 
the duration of a prison term. So imprecise is the concept of danger-
ousness that the punitively minded will have no difficulty in classify-
ing within it virtually all who currently find their miserable ways 
to prison, and, in addition, many offenders who currently receive 
probation or other community-based treatments. One need not look 
26. The ;results here are far superior to parole boards' capacity to predict violence 
on parole. Two recent studies from the California Department of Corrections research 
group by Doctor Wenk and his associates should give pause to any member of a parole 
board who has confidence in his capacities as a seer of future violent crime. The effort 
by this skilled group to develop a "violence prediction scale" for use in parole decisions 
resulted in eighty-six per cent of those identified as potentially dangerous failing to 
commit a violent act (more accurately, to be detected in a violent act) while on parole. 
See Wenk, Robison &: Smith, Can Violence Be Predicted?, 18 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 
393 (1972), and the excellent study of this problem by Geis and Monahan, The Social 
Ecology of Violence, soon to be published in MAN AND MORALITY (T. Lickona ed.). 
27. More than thirty-four per cent of the "Violent" group were reportedly involved 
in violent assaultive behavior. This compares to an incidence of such behavior among 
the "Safe" group of slightly more than eight per cent. 
28, A vigorous reanalysis of the implications of the Kozol study is being pursued by 
Doctor Kozol, Professor Alfred F. Conard of The University of Michigan Law School, 
Professor Franklin E. Zimring of The University of Chicago Law School, and the author. 
It threatens to produce another methodological article on the predictability of danger-
ousness. At issue are (a) the implications of the nonrelease of certain offenders, not 
included in the study, who were classified as dangerous by Doctor Kozol and his as• 
sociates, and (b) the appropriate attribution of unreported or undetected crimes to 
those described in this text as the subjects of false positive predictions of violence. 
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too closely at the populations of city jails and state prisons before 
safely rationalizing their inclusion under the expansive rubric of 
"dangerousness." 
Yet, it must be admitted, our inability to predict dangerousness 
with any acceptable measure of certainty does not alone compel the 
abandonment of dangerousness as a determinant of the decision to 
imprison. There are those, no doubt, who would accept the cost. 
Thus, any firm conclusion drawn from these observations on our 
modest capacity to predict violent behavior must await resolution 
of the second question addressed here-why risk any future criminal-
ity by releasing convicted criminals? My mvn conclusion may prop-
erly be foreshadowed: As a matter of justice we should never take 
power over the convicted person based on uncertain predictions of 
his dangerousness. 
C. Desert 
The third general principle guiding the decision to imprison dic-
tates a maximum of punishment limited by the concept of desert: 
No sanction greater than that "deserved" by·the last crime, or series 
of crimes, for which the offender is being sentenced should be im-
posed. The principle strikes directly at the larger question I have 
deferred, namely, why not hold all convicted criminals until risk of 
recidivism is past? My answer, in part, is that the link between estab-
lished crime and deserved suffering is a central precept of everyone's 
sense of justice, or, more precisely, of everyone's perception of in-
justice. To use the innocent as a vehicle for general deterrence would 
be seen by ·a11 as unjust, although it need not be ineffective if the 
innocence of the punished is concealed from the threatened group. 
Punishment in excess of what the community feels is the maximum 
suffering justly related to the harm the criminal has inflicted is, to 
the extent of the excess, a punishment of the innocent, notwithstand-
ing its effectiveness for a variety of purposes. 
That the concept of desert is not quantifiable and that it varies 
in time and place under the stress of changing circumstances does 
not reduce its centr~ importance as a necessary ceiling of punish-
ment. 
D. Preconditions to Imprisonment 
To take the matter beyond generalities and offer a more precise 
answer to the question of when a sentence of imprisonment may 
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justly be imposed, we should contrast the provisions of the ALI 
Model Penal Code with the substantially different preconditions to 
imprisonment offered above. 
Section 7.01 of the Model Penal Code directs the court not to 
sentence the convicted criminal to imprisonment unless: 
(a) there is undue risk that during the period of a suspended sen-
t~nce or probation the defendant will commit another crime; or 
(b) the defendant is in need of correctional treatment that can be 
provided most effectively by his commitment to an institution; or 
(c) a lesser sentence will depreciate the seriousness of the defen-
dant's crime.29 · 
Later state and federal reforms of sentencing practice have built 
upon, and, in varying degree, adopted these three criteria for re-
solving the question of whether or not to imprison.Bo 
As we have seen, criterion (a) is entirely unacceptable as a matter_ 
of principle. We lack the capacity to predict dangerousness that this 
criterion assumes, and, even if we could predict with substantially 
greater precision, to take power based on such a prediction is, as 
discussed below, an abuse of human rights. 
The second criterion-the need for correctional treatment-un-
ambiguously accepts the worst assumptions underlying the coercive 
rehabilitative model. It too must be rejected as an abuse of power 
over the individual. "Rehabilitation," whatever it means and what-
ever the programs that allegedly give it meaning, must cease to be a 
purpose of the prison sanction. This does not mean that we must 
abandon the variety of treatment programs developed within prisons. 
On the contrary, they need expansion. However, it does mean that 
they must not be seen as purposive in the sense that criminals are 
sent to prison for treatment. We must draw a sharp distinction be-
tween the primary purposes of incarceration and available opportu-
nities for the training and assistance of prisoners that may be pursued 
within those purp'oses.B1 
The third criterion-that any punishment other than imprison-
ment would not sufficiently reflect the seriousness of the defen-
dant's crime (sometimes expressed, "that imprisonment is necessary 
to deprecate the crime") has received universal acceptance, and, 
currently at least, provides an unavoidable justification for imprison-
~9. ALI CODE, supra note 3. 
30. See, e.g., ILL. REv. STAT, ch. 38, § 1005--6-1 (1973). See also STUDY DRAFr, supra 
note 17, § 3101. 
31. See note 1 supra. 
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ment. It reflects the obverse of the argument of the maximum 
deserved punishment as a ceiling to punishment. Retribution, so-
cialized under the criminal law from its roots in individual ven-
geance, not only limits the worst suffering we can inflict on the 
criminal but also dictates the minimum sanction a community will 
tolerate. For example, the typical wife slayer convicted of murder is 
most unlikely to be involved in future criminality, would be a safe 
bet under Model Penal Code criterion (a) were it acceptable, and 
probably needs none of the retraining contemplated by criterion (b). 
Nonetheless, he cannot, as a routine matter, be put on probation or 
given a suspended sentence, even were a showing made that the 
incidence of wife slaying would not increase upon a reduction 
of the frequency of imprisonment of wife slayers. The criminal 
law has general behavioral standard-setting functions; it acts as a 
moral teacher, and consequently requires a retributive floor to pun-
ishment as well as a retributive ceiling. 
If only one of the Code's criteria proves acceptable, what should 
we substitute? The three criteria I have offered could form the foun-
dation for a jurisprudence of the imprisonment decision for legisla-
tures and courts that care to create a_ statutory and common law of 
imprisonment. 
The first criterion derives directly from the Code and requires, 
only brief amplification. Imprisonment should be the least restric-
tive punishment appropriate in a given case because any lesser pun-
ishment would depreciate the seriousness of the crime(s) committed. 
An example of a typical murderer has been suggested; many others 
come to mind based on the brutality of the crime or the particular 
circumstances or notoriety of the criminal. Many white-collar crimes 
or crimes by those in positions of public responsibility or high public 
office belong in this category. The criterion requires, in brief, the 
lowest level of clemency tolerable under current punitive mores. 
My second criterion-the necessities of general deterrence and 
the appropriateness of this offender for deterrent purposes-finds no 
place in current codes but remains; in my view, inescapable.32 For 
example, it forms the principle on which rests the entire structure of 
income tax sanctions. Not every tax felon need be imprisoned, only 
a number sufficient to keep t~e law's promises and to encourage_the-
rest of us to honesty. Present arrangements for imprisoning federal 
32. See generally F. ZIMRING &: G. HAWKINS; DETERRENCE: THE LEGAL THREAT IN 
CRIME CoNl'ROL (1973). 
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tax offenders give an object lesson in the parsimonious application 
of general deterrent sanctions: Approximately 80 million tax returns 
were filed in 1972; only forty-three per cent of the 825 individuals 
convicted of tax fraud were jailed.33 
General deterrent purposes are also justified in many other areas 
of the crimfnal law, although they will frequently not call for im-
prisonment in areas serving merely regulatory purposes. The limi-
tation of the maximum deserved punishment for the particular of-
fender precludes imprisonment in this context unless, of course, the 
violation follows repeated breaches of the law, in which event the 
third suggested justification of imprisonment will apply. 
The third criterion for imposing imprisonment concerns cases 
in which lesser sanctions have frequently or recently been imposed 
on a given offender for earlier bouts of crime. This f aute de mieux 
criterion is also subject to a retributive maximum; no repetition of 
the entirely inconsequential should lead to imprisonment. However, 
there must be a role for imprisonment if lesser sanctions have been 
appropriately applied and the offender comes yet again for punish-
ment. The criminal law must keep its retributive promises, although 
it need not be precipitous fo moving to its heavy weaponry. 
These principles-the least restrictive sanction; imprisonment 
only when any alternative punishment would depreciate the serious-
ness of the crime, or is necessary for general deterrence, or when all 
else practicable has been applied; the whole limited by a concept of 
the maximum deserved punishment-offer a basis on which a ra-
tional use may be made of imprisonment. 
One further comment is pertinent. No principled jurisprudence 
of sentencing will emerge before legislatures bring order to their 
penal statutes or before judges routinely provide reasons for the 
sentences they impose. Only in this manner can the broad and de-
tailed sweep of a common law of sentencing evolve. 
II. WHY NOT IMPRISON ALL CONVICTED CRIMINALS UNTIL 
RISK OF FUTURE' CRIMINALITY Is PAST? 
It was suggested above that the incarceration of persons beyond 
a just maximum period for the sake of preventing the future crimes 
of a "dangerous" minority is improper. But why should we not try 
coercively to "cure" criminals, either in the therapeutic sense of 
33. The conviction figures include convictions after trial as well as pleas of guilty 
and nolo contendere. 1972 COMMR. OF INT. R.Ev. ANN. REP. 18-19. 
0 
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changing their behavior or in the sense of insulating ourselves from 
their future depredations? Is opposition to such cures a question of 
our inability to do so or an acknowledgement that it would cost too 
much? Or are there other reasons? Suppose we could, by an injection 
invented tomorrow, transform the criminal lion to the conforming 
lamb? For "cures" in the second sense-merely protecting the un-
convicted from the convicted-we have the machinery at hand. Cap-
ital punishment is an unqualifiedly successful cure; castration, either 
surgically or chemically achieved, substantially diminishes rape-
specific recidivism. Virtually all criminals can have their subsequent 
violent crime dramatically reduced by detaining them in prison until 
their fiftieth birthdays. Why should we not detain all predicted dan-
gerous offenders beyond the just maximum period of imprisonment 
for what they have done? After all, such punishment will, as ade-
quately demonstrated by the Kozol study, protect from serious per-
sonal injury the likely victims of at least one of each three so de-
tained. Surely, some will no doubt argue, thus to prevent serious 
crime justifies protracted incarceration of those who are, after all, 
convicted felons. 
The question pushes us to fundamentals. Is it a utilitarian issue 
or one of justice? The answer depends on the question's frame of 
reference. If the discussion of values be confined to the criminal law, 
surely imprisonment beyond the otherwise just punishment may be 
based on current predictions of dangerousness. We can in this man-
ner prevent some serious crimes of violence-and those who pay the 
cost of the gradual capital punishment that is protracted imprison-
ment are not particularly valuable citizens anyhow. The community 
seems prepared to meet the relatively small costs of providing the 
prison cages; it seems, if anything, quite pleased to do so. 
On the other hand, a different frame of reference leads to a dif-
ferent answer. Incarceration based on predicted dangerousness is 
unjust not because of a concern for the diminution of crime or the 
protection of prisoners. Rather, we should oppose excessive punish-
ments because of fundamental views of human dignity. We do not 
suspect, we know, that respect for the human condition requires 
drawing precise justiciable restraints on powers assumed over other 
persons. Slavery, in certain settings, provides a clearly desirable 
social and economic way of Jife-for other than the slaves. We reject 
it for a larger view of man and society in which we establish dogmatic 
prescriptions of human dignities, and, to the best of our govern-
mental abilities, protect them. Fairness and justice in the individual 
0 
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case, not a generalized cost-benefit utilitarian weighing, dictate the 
choice. 
Liberty, Rawls tells us, may only be limited in the interest of 
liberty itself and not for other social and economic advantages.84 
We may accept the proposition, and, with Rawls, test our principles 
of justice by asking whether "free and rational persons," ignorant of 
their own abilities and social positions and standing in what Rawls 
terms "the original position," would adopt minimum standards for 
prison and criteria for imprisonment. Rawls does not reach this ques-
tion. At the "original position" he would exclude the prisoner from 
the group of "free and rational persons concerned to further their 
own interests ... in an initial position of equality."86 Thus, assuming 
the individual can by his behavior choose riot to become a prisoner, 
one could argue that from behind "the veil of ignorance" that char-
acterizes social contracting at the original position, no one would 
identify himself as a potential prisoner. No one would, therefore, 
concern himself with the presence or absence of fair and just criteria 
for imprisonment. 
34. J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JurnCE 244 (1971). The reader unacquainted with Rawls's 
theory may be assisted by a summary of his "Main Idea," and of his view that liberty 
may be limited only for the sake of liberty. Such summarization is a task not to be 
attempted without an intellectual safety net. So, let me offer the words of H,LA. 
Hart: 
rP]rinciples of justice do not rest on mere intuition yet are not to be derived 
from utilitarian principles or any other teleological theory holding that there is 
some form of good to be sought and maximised. Instead, the principles of justice 
are to be conceived as those that free and rational persons concerned to further 
their own interests would agree should govern their forms of social life and institu-
tions if they had to choose such principles from behind "a veil of ignorance"-
that is, 1n ignorance of their own abilities, of their psychological propensities 
and conception of the good, and of their status and position in society and the 
level of development of the society of which' they are to be members. The position 
of these choosing parties is called "the original position." 
Hart, Rawls on Liberty and Its Priority, 40 U. Cm. L. REv. 534, 53_5 (1973). "[L]iberty 
is given a priority over all other advantages, so that it may be restricted or unequally 
distributed only for the sake of liberty and not for any other form of social or eco• 
nomic advantage." Id. at 536. 
Specifically, Rawls considers 
strict compliance [or ideal] as opposed to partial compliance theory •••• The latter 
studies the principles that govern how we are to deal with injustice •••• Obviously 
the problems of partial compliance theory are the pressing and urgent matters, 
These are the things that we are faced with in everyday life. The reason for be• 
ginning with ideal theory is that it provides, I believe, the only basis for the sys• 
tematic grasp of these more pressing problems." 
J. RAWLS, supra, at 8-9. I am, therefore, encouraged-with confidence in the value of 
the inquiry if not in the precision of the argument-to suggest that the same principles 
that move beyond utilitarian analysis in the assessment of justice in strict compliance 
legal theory are also applicable to criminal punishments. 
35. J. RAWLS, supra note 34, at 11. He therefore does not reach the issue of the 
prisoner's relationship to "justice as fairness." 
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This seems a much too narrow view. I could swiftly persuade a 
mass of "original position contractors" (quite apart from any im-
precise sentiments about "there, but for the Grace of God, go I") 
that they might well be born into a highly criminogenic social 
group-a disrupted family setting, membership within a prejudiced 
class with life experiences typified by fortuitous involvement in 
crime-bearing substantial risks of imprisonment for serious crime. 
Because all human behavior results from the interaction between 
endogenous processes and exogenous pressures and circumstances, 
the blank.et exclusion of prisoners from Rawls's "worst-off members 
of society" on the strength of a purported dominance of the individ-
ual's rationality and self-determination is unfounded. In considering 
prisons and prisoners from behind the veil of ignorance, therefore, 
we should include ourselves as potentially within the prison popula-
tion; we would, in that context, subscribe to concepts of fairness and 
justice that preclude the sacrifice of the individual prisoner to a 
supposed larger social good. 
Whatever my lack of clarity in relating Rawls's fundamental 
principles of justice to the sentencing of convicted criminals, and to 
the proper limits of imprisonment and prison punishments, this 
much seems clear: Not only lack of knowledge forces us to hesitate 
to impose dramatic or Draconian "cures" on criminals; basic views 
of the minimum freedoms and dignities rightfully accorded human 
beings stay our punitive hands. 
Utilitarian values, of course, also limit punitive excess. Were the 
punishment for the most trivial crime as severe as that for the most 
serious any efficacy in differential deterrence or in the moral force 
of the criminal law would dissipate. Nonetheless, the chief limita-
tion remains our view of justice as fairness, according defined mini-
mum freedoms and dignities to man qua man. The perception that 
abuse of governmental power is a central problem of the human con-
dition and that treatment of the criminal is closely bound to that 
problem serves as the fundamental inhibitor of excess. 
A proper cynicism about the likely abuse of power compels a 
limitation on maximum control over the criminal to that justified, 
wholly apart from considerations of curing him of his crime or pro-
tecting the rest of us permanently from future risk. We all know that 
if criminals are coercively cured today, the rest of us may tomorrow 
be regarded as in need of remedial training, both to achieve our 
maximum social potential and to minimize collateral injuries to 
others. If criminals, the mentally ill, or the retarded are subjected to 
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· coercive control beyond that justified by the past injuries they have 
inflicted, then 'why not you, and certainly me? We find ourselves in 
the business of remaking man, and that is beyond our competence; 
it is an empyrean rather than an earthly task. 
